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Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study 
Introduction 
Sentimentalists argue that the capacity to experience certain emotions is necessary for moral 
understanding. This view, if sound, has potentially important practical implications.i Firstly, 
if people who lack the relevant emotional capacities exist, then these people lack moral 
understanding. Secondly, if (as many moral philosophers and legal theorists believe) moral 
understanding is a necessary condition for moral and criminal responsibility, then people who 
lack the relevant emotional capacities are not morally or criminally responsible. Thirdly, to 
the extent that society subjects emotionally-incapacitated individuals, who are not morally or 
criminally responsible to harm, in the form of blame and punishment, then society is currently 
inflicting unjustified harm on these individuals, given that responsibility is widely considered 
a prerequisite for justifiable blame or punishment. Arguably, these considerations give rise to 
a morally pressing need to investigate whether there are people with the relevant emotional 
incapacities and whether reliable techniques can be developed for identifying them, to enable 
them to be exempted from blame and punishment. (Although, even if blaming and punishing 
emotionally-incapacitated individuals were unjustified, it could still be justified to detain/treat 
them to prevent them from harming others.) Philosophers and cognitive scientists have 
increasingly engaged in interdisciplinary research into these questions. A consensus seemed 
to be emerging (for an overview see Litton 2010) that psychopaths were plausible candidates 
for individuals lacking in the capacities that sentimentalists consider necessary for moral 
understanding and that the most promising technique for identifying psychopathy was the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare 2003.). Many philosophers who have written 
about the topic, have endorsed the conclusion of Malatesti and McMillan’s (2010) edited 
collection on psychopathy that “…based on a consideration of the empirical literature there 
are good reasons for not considering psychopaths morally responsible” (p319).ii However, 
increasingly, the empirical evidence regarding psychopaths’ supposed incapacities has 
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yielded seemingly conflicting results that have been very hard to interpret. This empirical 
uncertainty raises the question of how society should treat individuals who may have 
responsibility-undermining emotional incapacities.  
 
Some findings seem to indicate significant neurological and behavioural differences between 
psychopaths and non-psychopaths. However, other studies have failed to show significant 
abnormalities among the sample of psychopaths that were tested; most research indicates that 
psychopaths’ deficits seem to be a matter of degree; and there is some evidence that (at least 
some of) psychopaths’ abnormalities emerge only under certain, specific conditions (for 
overviews, see e.g. Blair 2017, Maibom 2017, Tillem et al 2019). Based on this equivocal 
evidence, a growing number of theorists have expressed varying amounts of scepticism about 
the claim that psychopaths are not morally responsible. For example, Jurjako and Malatesti 
(2018) have argued that psychopaths’ deficits seem context-dependent and that psychopaths 
should only be relieved from responsibility, if at all, in “unusual” (p1020) cases where the 
situation in which the crime was committed resembled the conditions in those experiments 
where psychopaths’ deficits were apparent. Maibom (2008, 2018) has argued that the 
evidence suggests that, at most, psychopaths’ emotional capacities are merely impaired and 
so they cannot be excused based on a lack of these capacities. Fox et al (2013) claim their 
“analysis of the empirical evidence” suggests that psychopaths should be considered partially 
responsible (p1). Jalava and Griffiths (2017) conclude that “in the absence of consistent data 
and a coherent way of determining their meaning, it is premature to use the data to pronounce 
on psychopaths’ responsibility…Inconsistent but suggestive data do not imply merely 
reduced responsibility, nor do they allow for tentative conclusions about responsibility” (p9). 
 
 
This chapter will argue that moral and legal philosophers should respond to this empirical 
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uncertainty by paying more attention to the issue of who should bear the burden of proof, and 
to what standard, before an individual can be held responsible. In the context of criminal 
responsibility, in common law criminal justice systems, the general rule, based on the 
presumption of innocence, is that the State bears the burden to prove the accused’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.iii However, there is an exception to this rule, known as “the 
presumption of sanity”, which, in some jurisdictions, places the burden of proof on the 
accused to prove certain mental incapacity defences (such as the “insanity” defence) on the 
balance of probabilities.iv In England and Wales, the Law Commission (2013) has proposed 
that the accused should only have to bring some evidence to raise the accused’s mental 
incapacity as a live issue, and then, after presenting this evidence, it would be for the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, in fact, possessed the mental 
capacities required for criminal responsibility.v This chapter will provide some reasons for 
thinking that that the Law Commission’s proposal is in accordance with the moral rationale 
underlying the beyond reasonable doubt principle. Applying these conclusions about the 
burden and standard of proof to the problem of individuals with emotional incapacities, it will 
be argued that  a) the current evidence is not strong enough to warrant excusing someone on 
the basis of a psychopathy diagnosis alone, but b)if there is a plausible interpretation of the 
evidence about the nature of psychopathy in general that is consistent with the sentimentalist’s 
basis for denying that such individuals have the capacity for moral understanding, then this 
evidence together with an assessment of the particular individual’s capacities (which must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis) could provide grounds for excusing particular 
individuals. Of course, sentimentalism is a contested theory and so there is theoretical 
uncertainty about this aspect of the case for excusing an individual with psychopathy (not just 
empirical uncertainty about the scientific evidence concerning the nature of psychopathy). 
However, I will suggest that the above-mentioned considerations relating to the burden and 
standard of proof should be applied to this theoretical uncertainty (as well as to empirical 
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uncertainty) and that any doubt about sentimentalism should be dealt with in favour of the 
accused.  
 
The first section of what follows will outline the argument, based on sentimentalism, for 
excusing individuals with certain emotional incapacities from moral and criminal 
responsibility. The second section will briefly describe key features of psychopathy as 
diagnosed by the PCL-R. The third section will discuss the appropriate burden and standard 
of proof when determining the criminal responsibility of psychopaths. The fourth section will 
summarise relevant research on psychopathy and will discuss an interpretation of this research 
that is consistent with psychopaths being entitled to an excuse on sentimentalist grounds. 
Finally, the fifth section will discuss the need for individualised evidence and will argue that 
it should be decided on a case-by-case basis whether someone diagnosed with psychopathy 
should be excused from criminal responsibility.  
Section 1: Emotional Capacities, Moral Understanding and Responsibility 
Moral sentimentalists take different views about the precise role of emotions in moral understanding 
and about which emotions might be required, and about the nature of emotion (for overviews of these 
issues see: Kauppinen 2014). One of the earliest proponents of sentimentalism was the 18th-century 
philosopher, David Hume, who argued that feelings of approval or disapproval were a necessary part 
of making moral judgements (Hume, Selby-Bigge ed. 1975). Hume thought that these feelings stemmed 
from sympathy, which involved sharing another person’s feelings. Many contemporary theorists who 
subscribe to the idea that psychopaths lack moral understanding have based their arguments on the idea 
that psychopaths lack the capacity for “empathy”, which resembles Hume’s conception of sympathy 
(Deigh 1995; Fine and Kennett 2004; Levy 2007; Morse 2008; Haji 2009; Glenn et al 2011; Focquaert 
et al 2014). There are different conceptions of empathy (for a taxonomy see Maibom 2017b). For the 
purposes of this chapter, the following account of empathy will be outlined which seems broadly to 
capture what many theorists seem to have in mind. Empathy involves the ability to feel an appropriate 
emotion in response to someone else’s emotion or predicament (e.g. compassion at someone’s 
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distress).vi It implies that one can experience a feeling of caringvii to some extent about the other person 
and that one can feel some aversion to the idea of other people being harmed. The connection between 
empathy and moral understanding, on this view, is that one cannot “get the point” of moral norms 
prohibiting harm to others, if is incapable of experiencing a feeling of caring about other people. On 
this view, merely understanding, purely intellectually, that there is a rule against seriously harming 
people, or that others label such actions “wrong”, is not enough for genuine moral understanding (or at 
least it is not enough for genuine understanding of harm-based moral norms). The ability to list such 
rules while being cut off from their emotional content, might be compared to a parrot’s ability to repeat 
words without grasping their meaning. Theorists who take this view often argue that understanding the 
moral wrongfulness of harming others requires emotional capacities that are not required for 
understanding non-moral norms, e.g. social conventions like dress codes (see section 4.1 below). They 
argue that one does not really understand what is wrong with, for example, a person stepping on 
someone’s face for sadistic pleasure, if one has never been capable of feeling any more aversion to the 
thought of harming others than one would feel about breaching a rule not to step on the grass.  
 
It might be objected that people often judge actions that harm a person to be morally wrong without 
feeling empathy at that time or ever feeling empathy for that person. For example, one might be able 
to understand the wrongfulness of harms done centuries ago, or the wrongfulness of harming an 
adversary without feeling empathy for those victims.viii In reply, it might be suggested that moral 
understanding requires the capacity to empathise with someone, at some point, in order to learn the 
meaning of moral concepts, even if one does not need to empathise every time one later encounters or 
applies those moral concepts. By analogy, arguably in order to fully understand what is meant by the 
word “blue”, a person would have had to see the colour blue at some point, but after learning this 
concept, she can then understand what her friend is talking about when he phones her up and says he 
has painted his room blue, even though she has not seen her friend’s room. 
 
Another objection might be based on an alternative conception of moral understanding based on 
rationalism, according to which, unlike sentimentalism, moral understanding does not require empathy, 
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but is an intellectual matter analogous to mathematical reasoning (Gill 2007). The rationalist might 
argue, for example, that if one thinks one’s own pain is bad, one is rationally committed to believing, 
to be consistent, that it is wrong to inflict pain on others (A similar objection is discussed in Deigh 
1995). In reply, firstly, it is not clear how the rationalist can, without begging the question, explain the 
leap from thinking one’s own pain is “bad”, in the sense of disliking it, to thinking that causing others’ 
pain is “wrong”, in the sense of morally wrong. Secondly, inconsistency is not necessarily always 
irrational. Putting milk in one’s tea on Monday and then, for no particular reason, drinking one’s tea 
without milk on Tuesday is, in a sense, inconsistent without being irrational (Deigh 1995). Thirdly, 
even if it were demonstrated that immorality involved an irrational kind of inconsistency, it is not clear 
that understanding that hurting others is “irrational because inconsistent” is the same as understanding 
that it is “morally wrong”. Imagine that someone said, “I firmly believe that harming others is morally 
wrong, and so I never harm others, although I have always felt neutral/pleased/amused at other people’s 
distress in itself. It’s the inconsistency that bothers me.” The sentimentalist would doubt the speaker 
had genuine moral understanding of what was wrong about harming others. 
 
There is not scope in this chapter to engage further in the debate between sentimentalists and rationalists 
about the nature of moral understanding. I will suggest in the next section that the arguments in favour 
of sentimentalism may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether individuals who are 
incapable of empathy can understand moral norms and that this might be enough to justify excusing 
them. 
 
At this point, it is necessary briefly to spell out the connection between moral understanding, moral 
responsibility and criminal responsibility. Most philosophers accept that in order to be held morally 
responsible for failing to act in accordance with moral reasons, one must be capable of guiding one’s 
actions in accordance with moral reasons, which requires (among other conditions) that one understands 
such reasons (for an influential account of moral responsibility see Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Many 
theorists of criminal law and punishment, in turn, accept that moral responsibility should be a 
precondition for criminal responsibility. For example, according to retributivism (which may be the 
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dominant view among penal theorists – Matravers 2016) punishment is only justified if the offender 
deserves it, in virtue of being morally responsible for a wrongful act. Communication theorists (e.g. 
Duff 2001) explain the connection between moral understanding and criminal responsibility partly by 
reference to punishment’s aims of communicating a message of moral disapproval of criminal 
wrongdoing and attempting to persuade offenders to reform. These aims depend on the offender being 
able to understand this moral message and to understand the moral reasons for reforming.  The literature 
on the criminal responsibility of psychopaths has been particularly influenced by the communication 
theory of punishment (see, e.g., Duff 1977, Fine and Kennett 2004, Morse 2008, Shaw 2009). 
 
Theorists who maintain that psychopaths should be excused from criminal responsibility 
typically focus on psychopaths’ eligibility for the insanity defence, which in many common 
law criminal justice systems is based on the McNaghten rules, which state that to qualify for 
the defence,  the accused must have, at the time of the crime, suffered from  “a disease of the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that 
he did not know he was doing what was wrong”.ix  However, knowledge of  wrongfulness has 
been interpreted by the courts in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, as knowledge 
of legal rather than moral wrongfulness. However, the Law Commission (2013) have proposed 
to replace the insanity defence with a broader defence, which would allow the jury to consider 
whether the accused had the capacity to understand the moral wrongfulness of his conduct. 
This chapter will be based on the assumption, shared by many legal theorists, that the insanity 
defence (or an equivalent defence) ought to include an incapacity for moral understanding.  
 
It should also be noted that arguments for excusing psychopaths from responsibility have been 
developed that are more consistent with other metaethical theories, such as rationalism (e.g. Nelkin 
2016). There is not scope within this chapter to provide an account of these other arguments. However, 
this chapter exemplifies a methodology that could be adopted by proponents of these other arguments:  
i.e. 1) present the metaethical and normative arguments for a particular set of criteria for responsibility, 
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2) present the empirical evidence that psychopaths do not meet these criteria, and 3) consider whether 
these arguments and this evidence has met the required standard of credibility. As will be explained in 
the next section, the cumulative weight of different kinds of arguments for excusing psychopaths 
(including arguments not explored in this chapter) could strengthen the overall case for excusing 
psychopaths, even if there is some uncertainty about the soundness of each argument individually.  
 
Section 2: PCL-R Psychopathy 
Some descriptions of the PCL-R psychopath seem to suggest that psychopaths lack moral 
understanding on a sentimentalist view. On these descriptions, psychopaths seem emotionally cut off 
from other people and do not seem to have ever genuinely cared about anyone (Hare 1999x). Most 
people, including most convicted offenders, care about some people, such as their immediate relatives, 
friends or partner. Yet psychopaths apparently show no compunction about hurting, abandoning or 
using anyone who might try to form an intimate relationship with them. Even the concept of “honour 
among thieves” seems alien to the psychopath. While, for instance, criminal gang-members typically 
show some loyalty to other members, psychopaths will betray their associates whenever it suits them. 
On this account of psychopathy, this lack of an emotional bond with others is not simply the result of 
psychopaths becoming “hardened” through a criminal lifestyle but stems from a personality disorder 
that prevented them caring about others even in early childhood. While normally developing two-year 
olds typically show some aversion to signs of another’s distress and will typically stop performing an 
action when they perceive it is hurting someone and are responsive to parents’ disapproval of such 
behaviour; toddlers with psychopathic traits seem unfazed by others’ distress or parents’ disapproval 
(Kahn 2012). There are descriptions of very young children with psychopathic traits showing chilling 
detachment toward others’ suffering. One child with psychopathic traits calmly watched a sibling in a 
pool unable to swim, and failed to get help, saying he was “curious” about what drowning would look 
like; another gradually cut off a cat’s tail, in a series of small amputations, just to see what would 
happen (Kahn 2012).  
 
However, not all individuals diagnosed as psychopaths using the PCL-R criteria will fit this description 
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of the “archetypal” psychopath (even though this kind of description is often provided by researchers 
who assume that the PCL-R is the best tool for diagnosing psychopathy that we currently have).   An 
incapacity to feel empathy and an incapacity to form enduring relationships are just two factors out of 
twenty. Someone could meet the cut off score for psychopathy, even if they scored 0 on these factors, 
meaning that their empathy and ability to form relationships was intact (Maibom 2018). Failure, in 
certain studies, to exclude certain PCL-R “psychopaths” with intact empathic abilities may explain 
some of the inconsistent data discussed in section 4, below. (For a discussion of ways of improving the 
exclusion criteria when conducting such studies see Rosenberg Larsen 2018) 
Section 3: Psychopathy and Empirical Uncertainty 
Jalava and Griffiths (2017) claim that most philosophers who discuss psychopathy take the 
empirical literature about psychopaths' supposed deficits at face value, without 
questioning the reliability and validity of the data. They caution against this approach, 
arguing that before theorists can say anything useful about the moral and legal 
responsibility of psychopaths, they must first engage critically and in detail with the 
science. It is futile, according to Jalava and Griffiths, to embark on philosophical and 
legal arguments, no matter how sophisticated, before the existence of psychopaths' 
deficits has been scientifically established. They draw the following analogy: no matter 
how legally astute they may be, there would be no point in defence and prosecution 
lawyers debating the legal implications of knife wounds on a corpse, before the coroner 
had established that the wounds existed in the first place. 
 
This raises fundamental questions about how interdisciplinary research should be conducted 
in this area, given that most philosophers and lawyers are not scientifically trained and must 
rely heavily on the conclusions of scientific experts about the state of the evidence. Must 
philosophical and legal theorists wait until a consensus among these scientific experts 
emerges, before they can comment on the legal and philosophical implications? Given that 
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judges and juries cannot just throw up their hands and wait until science progresses, there has 
to be some kind of default position in the meantime. What that default position should be is 
an important ethical and legal question. A second key question concerns the level of certainty 
that should be required about psychopaths' deficits before moral and legal consequences 
should follow. The required level of certainty might well differ, depending on the nature of 
these consequences, e.g. moral versus legal responsibility, full exemption from responsibility 
versus diminished responsibility, mitigation of sentence versus preventative incapacitation. 
Thirdly, theorists can also usefully respond to a division of opinion between scientists about 
how to interpret the evidence, by mapping out the legal and philosophical implications of 
different possible scenarios, i.e., if interpretation a) is correct then certain legal and 
philosophical implications would follow, and if interpretation b) is correct then other 
implications would follow. This third point could generate proposals about a practical way 
forward, if it were combined with conclusions about the first two questions concerning the 
required levels of certainty for different legal/moral consequences and the conclusions about 
what the "default" position should be.  
 
This chapter will focus on the required standard of credibility for holding psychopaths 
criminally responsible, given that holding people criminally responsible can warrant inflicting 
serious harm on them and is therefore of considerable practical importance. Arguably, the 
standard for holding psychopaths morally (but not criminally) responsible might be lower, 
given the less serious practical consequences of doing so.xi Given that moral responsibility is 
a precondition for criminal responsibility on many influential theories of criminal law and 
punishment (for overviews see: Duff and Hoskins 2017), it is worth spelling out the 
implications of endorsing both a) the principle that moral responsibility is required for 
criminal responsibility and b) the idea of having a lower standard of credibility for moral 
versus criminal responsibility. This would imply that, while doubts about the justification for 
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holding psychopaths morally responsible might not preclude holding psychopaths morally 
responsible (without imposing criminal responsibility), these same doubts about psychopaths’ 
moral responsibility might preclude holding them criminally responsible. 
In general, the default principle, in the context of criminal responsibility, is the presumption 
of innocence. The principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused’s 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is regarded as fundamental in Anglo-American legal systems. 
It has been vividly described as the “golden thread” running throughout the “web” of English 
criminal law.xii The “beyond reasonable doubt” principle is also, with few exceptions, widely 
endorsed by legal theorists, although there is still debate about the best justification for the 
principle and how a “reasonable doubt” should be interpreted (see, e.g., Picinali 2018, Reiman 
and Van Den Haag 1990). The more general idea that that the accused’s guilt must be 
established to a high degree of certainty is recognised across wide range of jurisdictions, 
despite variations in how the principle is formulated (Clermont 2002).   
This chapter will suggest that one way of dealing with the conflicting and puzzling evidence 
about psychopaths’ impairments is to apply the beyond reasonable doubt standard, so that if 
the arguments and evidence are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether they 
lack the capacity for moral understanding, then psychopaths should not be held criminally 
responsible. Given the complexity of the issues, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide 
a full justification for applying the beyond reasonable doubt standard in this context. Instead 
it will consider two of the main objections that might be raised against this approach and 
provide some reasons for thinking that these objections can be overcome.  
The first objection is that  “reasonable doubts” concerning the accused’s mental capacities 
should be treated differently from doubts about other parts of the prosecution’s case.  Rather 
than requiring the prosecution to prove the accused’s sanity beyond reasonable doubt, legal 
systems typically start with the default position that the accused is presumed to be of sound 
mind. A burden of proof is placed on the accused to rebut this presumption. This rule is 
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sometimes called “the presumption of sanity”. The rationale behind this presumption is 
disputed. It seems to be influenced, at least partly, by practical considerations. Ferguson 
(2018) calls it an “empirically-based” presumption, resting on the “common-sense” idea that 
most people, most of the time have the mental capacities required to be held responsible. If it 
were very rare for accused persons to suffer from responsibility-undermining mental 
disorders, then compelling the prosecution to bring evidence to rule out this remote possibility 
in every case would waste the court’s time.   However, serious mental disorders are much 
more common among those accused of crimes than the general population, and although 
mentally disordered offenders rarely qualify for a mental incapacity defence, this is arguably 
because such defences are unjustifiably restrictive (Kelly 2018). Other practical 
considerations include the difficulties the prosecution might face in getting evidence that the 
accused had the required mental capacities. However, the Law Commission (2013) have 
persuasively argued that these practical considerations cannot justify placing an onerous 
burden on the accused to establish that they lacked the capacities required for responsibility. 
They point to the fact that these practical considerations apply equally to defences such as 
automatism, yet it has proved quite workable to require the prosecution to bear the burden of 
disproving those defences (once the accused has discharged the very light burden of just 
presenting enough evidence to raise the defence as a live issue). A more theoretical argument 
for the “presumption of sanity” is that it shows respect for the accused’s autonomy to prove 
his “insanity” before making him eligible for hospitalisation, which would amount to a serious 
“indignity” if he were sane (Brudner 1998, 308. Related theoretical arguments are considered 
and dismissed in Fine and Kennett 2004). However, it not clear that hospitalising a sane 
person is worse than imprisoning a mentally disordered person. If the accused has raised a 
mental incapacity defence (which is usually the case – Law Commission 2013, p180), this 
suggests that the accused has decided imprisonment is the worse option, and it not clear why 
the state should try to “protect” them from the consequences of that decision, based on the 
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state’s view of which option is worse. Furthermore, decisions about whether hospitalisation 
and treatment are required can be made separately from the determination of criminal 
responsibility, based on different criteria (Law Commission 2013).  
The second objection focuses on my suggestion that the beyond reasonable doubt standard 
should apply to the philosophical positions (e.g. sentimentalism) that are part of the overall 
case for excusing the psychopath, not just to the empirical evidence. Various writers have 
argued that the beyond reasonable doubt standard should apply to theoretical claims, not just 
empirical ones (see e.g. Pereboom 2006, Vilhauer 2009, Shaw 2014, Caruso 2018). One 
plausible defence of this approach is that the beyond reasonable doubt standard rests on a 
more fundamental principle about which there is widespread agreement among theorists from 
a range of different perspectives. Vilhauer (2009, 2012) has argued that this fundamental 
principle is the idea that there is a powerful presumption against inflicting serious harm on 
others, and that this presumption can only be displaced if there is a high degree of certainty 
that doing so is justified. It would be arbitrary, on this view, just to require a high degree of 
certainty about empirical considerations and not theoretical ones. Vilhauer argues that if there 
is a philosophically valuable debate about an issue then there must be a reasonable doubt 
about that issue. This seems plausible. If reasonable people, with relevant expertise, who have 
thought seriously about a question still disagree about how to answer it, it seems natural to 
say that there must be a reasonable doubt about the answer.  There is a philosophically 
valuable debate about whether rational faculties alone are sufficient for moral understanding, 
or whether empathy is also required. 
Different positions might be taken about how much certainty should be required that 
psychopaths lack moral understanding before they should be excused. I have suggested that 
raising a reasonable doubt as to psychopaths’ capacity for moral understanding should be 
enough, but it might be argued that the threshold should be somewhat higher. Similarly, 
different positions might be taken as to how to interpret “reasonable doubt”. The fact that 
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reasonable experts in the area who have seriously considered the matter have endorsed a 
particular argument for excusing psychopaths might be thought enough to raise a reasonable 
doubt. However, even if it were thought that one line of argument endorsed by one group of 
experts had not met the required threshold of certainty on its own, if we consider several lines 
of argument for excusing psychopaths (e.g. arguments based on empathic deficits, arguments 
based on evaluative deficits, arguments based on control deficits etc.) and each argument 
raised some doubt whether psychopaths were responsible, the cumulative weight of these 
doubts could meet the threshold for excusing them.  
 
 
Section 4: Evidence of Lack of Moral Understanding 
This section will summarise some of the key empirical findings concerning psychopaths’ 
moral understanding and emotional capacities. Firstly, it will briefly discuss one type of study 
that attempts to measure psychopaths' moral understanding directly, by investigating 
psychopaths’ ability to appreciate certain features of moral norms supposedly captured by the 
“moral/conventional” distinction. It will then discuss a second type of study that may 
indirectly shed light on psychopaths’ moral understanding, by investigating emotional 
capacities that arguably underlie or enable the acquisition of moral understanding. These 
studies have generated complex and seemingly conflicting results. However, after describing 
each type of study, an interpretation of the evidence will be suggested that more-or-less 
reconciles these results and that is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that (at least some) 
psychopaths lack moral understanding. (The results of some studies may not fit with this 
interpretation due to their use of an over-inclusive definition of psychopathy, which may fail 
to exclude certain individuals with relatively intact empathy, as noted in section 2 above.) 
4.1: The Moral/Conventional Distinction 
One type of moral reasoning task relies on the moral/conventional distinction. 
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Although, this paradigm has been criticised (e.g. Kelly 2007, Shoemaker 2011), 
many theorists and cognitive scientists accept that it can shed some light on 
psychopaths' moral understanding (e.g. Blair 1995, Fine and Kennett 2004, Levy 
2007, 2014). According to this paradigm, violations of moral norms, e.g. norms 
prohibiting assault, tend to have the following characteristics: 1) they tend to be more 
serious than transgressing conventional norms, 2) they are wrong at least partly 
because of harm to the victim 3) they are wrong independent of whether there is any 
rule against them, and 4) they would be wrong even if an authority-figure permitted 
them. In contrast, breaches of conventional norms (e.g. norms about the clothes to be 
worn as part of a school uniform) tend to be less serious than moral transgressions, tend 
not to be harm-based, and tend to be rule-dependent and authority-dependent. 
 
Blair et al, who pioneered research on psychopaths’ understanding of the 
moral/conventional distinction, concluded that psychopaths give abnormal responses 
to questions about it, suggesting that they may not genuinely understand the 
distinction (Blair et al 2001, 1995, Blair 1997).  However, overall the results of studies 
in this area have been mixed. Psychopaths draw some distinction between moral and 
conventional transgressions based on the seriousness characteristic, but to a lesser 
extent than non-psychopaths (Blair 1995, 1997). When psychopaths are asked to come 
up with a reason on their own why moral transgressions are wrong, they are much less 
likely to invoke harm-based considerations (Arsenio and Fleiss 1996, Blair 1997). 
However, if psychopaths are explicitly asked whether an example of an immoral act 
causes harm, they tend to answer correctly (Aharoni et al 2012, 2014). When asked 
whether the action would still be wrong if there were no rule against it, psychopaths 
are less likely than controls to distinguish between moral and conventional 
transgressions on this basis (Blair 1995, 1997). However, when psychopaths are 
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presented with eight transgressions and are explicitly told that half are "moral" and 
half "conventional", psychopaths can group the transgressions into each category as 
accurately as non-psychopaths (Aharoni et al 2012, 2014). 
4.2: The Moral/Conventional Distinction: Interpreting the Evidence 
It is now relatively often suggested that Aharoni et al’s findings (2012, 2014) discredit Blair’s 
claim that psychopaths cannot draw the moral/conventional distinction (see e.g., Barnes 2018, 
Jurjako and Malatesti 2018, p1013, Jalava and Griffiths 2017, p 5, and Schlaich Borg and 
Sinnott-Armstrong 2013, p124). However, there are interpretations of the findings which are 
consistent with Blair’s claim that psychopaths lack genuine understanding of the features of 
moral norms that the moral/convention distinction aims to capture. Levy (2014) points out that 
a) Aharoni et al asked psychopaths how others would categorise the transgressions, which may 
invite psychopathic participants to “parrot” the expected answers, even if the psychopaths 
themselves do not endorse or grasp the nature of moral norms and b) Aharoni et al told 
participants that half of the short list of transgressions were moral and half conventional, which 
gives them a substantial clue as to what the “right” answer would look like, making it easier to 
complete the task, even if the psychopathic participants lacked genuine understanding. In 
contrast, Blair’s design asked participants for their own views, and did not give them this clue. 
 
Apart from these empirical debates about how to interpret psychopaths’ responses to the 
moral/conventional test, there are theoretical concerns about the whether the 
moral/conventional distinction accurately captures the nature of moral norms (e.g. Shoemaker 
2011, Kelly 2007). Such concerns are sometimes cited as grounds to doubt any argument for 
excusing psychopaths that relies on psychopaths’ supposed inability to draw this distinction 
(e.g. Godman and Jefferson 2017). However, while these concerns suggest that the theoretical 
underpinnings of the moral/conventional test need to be refined, they do not necessarily 
undermine the specific examples used by the test to probe psychopaths’ moral understanding. 
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For example, while proponents of the distinction may be mistaken in assuming that moral 
norms are completely authority-independent, since the “victim” may have the relevant 
authority (Shoemaker 2011), this point does not undermine the specific example used in the 
test that merely assumes, rightly, that the norm prohibiting one child from hitting another child 
does not depend on whether the teacher gave permission to do this.  Similarly, while it may be 
wrong to assume, in general, that all moral norms are based on welfare, it is plausible that the 
wrongfulness of the specific moral transgressions that feature in the test depend, at least partly, 
on considerations concerning the victim’s welfare. 
There seems to be a plausible interpretation of the moral/conventional distinction studies that 
suggests that psychopaths may fail to grasp important features of moral norms. It seems 
particularly telling that they often fail to come up with welfare-based justifications when asked 
why transgressions involving harm to others are wrong. When asked why hitting or kicking a 
child to make her cry is wrong, some psychopaths gave answers such as “it’s not socially 
acceptable” (Blair 1995, 212) – the same sort of reason they give for why conventional 
transgressions are wrong. This is just what would be predicted by the hypothesis that (at least 
some) psychopaths have an inability to empathise that prevents them from grasping what is 
morally wrong with hurting others and leads them to see moral norms as a set of arbitrary 
prohibitions equivalent to mere conventions. This is not undercut by the finding that 
psychopaths can respond correctly when explicitly asked whether an act harms the victim, as 
this latter question does not probe whether psychopaths themselves consider the victim’s 
welfare relevant to moral wrongfulness.  
 
4.3: Emotional Capacities 
A wide range of studies have been conducted on emotional capacities that arguably 
underlie or enable the acquisition of moral understanding. These emotional capacities 
include: firstly, “affective theory of mind” – the ability to infer from the context what 
another is feeling; secondly, the ability to recognise another’s emotions, such as distress 
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and fear, from cues such as facial expression and tone of voice; and thirdly, the ability to 
feel an automatic, aversive emotional response to the recognition that another is afraid 
or distressed. Recognising what others’ feel is necessary in order to understand how one 
morally ought to treat them. Evidence that psychopaths could not recognise others’ 
feelings through the means investigated by the studies would not conclusively prove that 
they have impaired understanding, as they might work out what others feel through 
different means. However, (as will be explained in more detail in 5.2.3 below) evidence 
of impaired emotion recognition taken together with evidence of impaired emotional 
responsiveness make more plausible the idea that psychopaths are somehow cut off from 
others’ emotions and thereby fail to develop a genuine understanding of norms about 
how others should be treated. 
 
Studies on affective theory of mind typically ask participants to work out what various 
characters in a scene or vignette are feeling, based on information about the context. For 
example, normal participants may be expected to infer that character A desires object X, 
and that character B desires the same object, and that A will feel disappointed if B, rather 
than A, obtains the object Psychopaths seem to perform the same as controls when the 
scenarios are relatively straightforward, e.g. based on a simple cartoon image (Sebastian 
2012, Shamay-Tsoory 2010). However, psychopaths seem to perform less well when the 
scenarios and questions are more complex, e.g. when asked to record the different 
feelings characters experience during the course of a fifteen-minute video and when 
asked about the relationship between two or more characters' feelings, rather than just  
being asked about one character (Sharp and Vanwoerden 2014). Furthermore, although 
psychopaths' responses to the simple scenarios are similar to non-psychopaths, they seem 
to employ different brain regions when making these decisions. In addition, another type 
of study suggests that psychopaths do not register other people's perspectives in the 
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automatic way that non-psychopaths do. When non-psychopathic participants were 
asked to count dots on a screen, they were slower at doing so if they could also see a 
character on the screen from whose viewpoint a different number of dots were visible 
(Drayton et al 2018). It seems that non-psychopaths automatically register the character's 
perspective, which interferes with their response about what they can see from their own 
perspective, causing a delayed reaction. However, this time delay was not observed in 
psychopaths, suggesting that they did not automatically detect the character's 
perspective. 
 
Some studies on psychopaths' ability to recognise others' emotions based on their facial 
expression or voice have suggested that psychopaths are less able to identify negative 
emotions such as sadness and fear, compared to non-psychopaths (Jusyte et al 2014, Blair 
et al 2005). However, when psychopaths' attention is directed in certain ways, they seem 
to perform normally. For example, in one study in which psychopaths were less accurate 
than controls at identifying facial emotions, it was observed that psychopaths were 
looking at the mouth region of the face, which carries less emotional information than 
the eye area. When psychopaths were explicitly asked to look at the eye area, their 
performance was normal (Dadds et al 2006). However, when the images flashed up so 
quickly that the participant's direction of gaze could not make a difference, their ability 
to recognise facial emotions seemed impaired compared with non-psychopathic controls 
(Jusyte et al 2014). There is also some evidence that psychopaths struggle to distinguish 
real from feigned distress (Dawell 2019).  
 
Certain physiological reactions (e.g. increased skin conductance and fear-potentiated 
startle) that are associated with aversive states are normally seen in non-psychopaths 
when viewing images of others in distress, suggesting that they find others’ distress 
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aversive. However, most studies on this topic suggest that these physiological responses 
to distress are deficient in psychopaths (see references in Maibom 2017a, p 1119). 
Furthermore, in some studies, regions of the brain, such as the amygdala, associated with 
processing emotional stimuli in non-psychopaths, did not activate normally when 
psychopaths were asked to evaluate facial expressions. This difference in amygdala 
activation between psychopaths and non-psychopaths appeared even when the emotional 
images flashed up so quickly that direction of gaze could not make a difference (Viding 
et al 2012). Some studies have also shown adult psychopaths and children with 
psychopathic traits have significantly lower amygdala volume than non-psychopaths 
(Blair 2005).  Blair (2019) summarises the evidence as follows: “In summary, the 
existing literature relatively reliably indicates reduced responsiveness to facial expressions, 
particularly distress cues, in children and adults with conduct problems that may be 
particularly marked in those with psychopathic traits. The regions implicated across studies 
are not always consistent… but the basic finding of reduced neural responsiveness appears 
robust.” 
4.4: Emotional Capacities: Interpreting the Evidence 
 
One plausible interpretation that reconciles the mixed evidence on emotional capacities is 
that, while most non-psychopaths can automatically infer from the context what others are 
feeling, recognise others’ distress and find others’ distress aversive, (at least some) 
psychopaths’ automatic ability to do these things is significantly deficient (Tillem et al 2019). 
In specific circumstances, it seems that (at least some psychopaths) can exercise these 
capacities (non-automatically), provided their attention is suitably directed by the 
experimenter, although, it remains possible that individuals with severe psychopathy still 
have abnormal neurological responses, even in these circumstances. Blair (2019) points out 
that group-level results may mask the deficits of individual members of the group. An 
experiment failing to reveal deficient responses to emotional stimuli, under certain conditions, 
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in the psychopathic group overall (whose members had varied degrees of psychopathy) is still 
compatible with the hypothesis that a subset of individuals with high psychopathic traits still 
had reduced responses under these conditions. Blair (2019, p295) hypothesises that “…if the 
intensity of this stimulus is sufficiently heightened, via an attentional manipulation that 
increases the emotional stimulus’ representational strength, group differences are reduced 
(because the individuals with lower psychopathic traits reach an asymptote level in 
responding).” Furthermore, it seems plausible that deficits in automatic emotion-processing 
leads, firstly, to an impaired ability to infer others’ emotions from the context when the 
situation is relatively complex and, secondly, to an impaired ability to recognise emotions, 
such as another’s distress, when there is no opportunity to take the time to focus on certain 
cues. The hypothesis that psychopaths have reduced emotional responses to others’ distress 
is supported by the evidence that psychopaths show volume reduction in the amygdala (a 
brain area associated with these responses).  
 
The next question is whether this interpretation of the evidence is consistent with 
arguments that (at least some) psychopaths have grounds for an excuse based on the idea 
that their emotional incapacities deprive them of genuine moral understanding. Based on 
research, such as that discussed above, showing that psychopaths sometimes have normal 
behavioural and neurological responses when performing tasks that purport to test 
morally relevant capacities, Jurjako and Malatesti (2018) claim that "psychopaths seem 
to have a general capacity to appreciate moral considerations" (p1016).xiii If psychopaths 
perform normally at least some of the time this, according to Jurjako and Malatesti, 
indicates that they have the general capacities required for moral responsibility. 
Nevertheless, since psychopaths appear to show deficits in certain contexts, Jurjako and 
Malatesti maintain that it is still an open question whether individual psychopathic 
wrongdoers had the specific capacities required for responsibility at the time of their 
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wrongful acts. They suggest, however, that occasions when psychopaths lack these 
specific capacities are likely to be rare, for the following reasons. Firstly, even if 
psychopaths are unable to automatically register morally relevant information based on 
certain cues (e.g. facial expressions), they might be able to register this information by 
consciously attending to these cues. Secondly, even if they cannot register morally 
relevant information from certain sources (e.g. facial expressions) they might gain this 
information from other sources. Jurjako and Malatesti suggest for example, that a 
psychopath staging an armed bank robbery might not be able to detect the bank clerk's 
fear from her facial expression, but could infer it from other signs, e.g. screaming, putting 
her hands in the air etc. (Jurjako and Malatesti 2018). To show that psychopaths' 
(supposed) deficits might not undermine their responsibility, they draw an analogy with 
a colourblind person who is responsible for jay-walking, despite his inability to see the 
red light, because he should have worked out other ways of telling whether the light was 
red, based on, e.g. the order of the lights and other people's behaviour. Only in unusual 
circumstances, such as the authorities unforeseeably altering the order of the lights, 
would the colourblind person be relieved of responsibility. Similarly, they argue, the 
psychopath would only be non-responsible in relatively unusual circumstances. 
 
However, there are alternative interpretations of the data, which, if correct, would 
increase the likelihood that an individual with psychopathy was non-responsible for 
his or her act. If, as suggested above, the evidence indicates that (at least some) 
psychopaths do not automatically register and respond to others' morally relevant 
emotions, this might have undermined their moral development so that they failed to 
develop into moral agents in the first place. For example, Blair (2017) has argued 
that psychopathy is a developmental disorder that is often apparent from earliest 
childhood. As noted above, it has been frequently observed, that, unlike normally 
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developing children, children with psychopathic tendencies (or at least those children 
with the severe form of the disorder) seem unresponsive to the attempts of parents 
and teachers to socialise them, seem unable to form loving relationships with others, 
including primary care-givers, and seem, even as toddlers, capable of inflicting pain 
without the inhibition about doing this that is seen in non-psychopathic toddlers (see, 
e.g., Hare 1999, Kahn 2012). Blair (2017) describes a body of developmental 
research that supports the proposition that an automatic aversive response to 
perceiving another’s distress is crucial part of moral development  (see also references 
in Cushman et al 2017). When a normally-developing child perpetrates or witnesses 
care-based transgressions, which involve hurting someone else, the child will “learn 
the badness of the care-based transgressions because of the pairing of the victim’s 
distress [which the child observing it finds aversive] with the commission (or 
observation of someone else committing) the care-based transgression” (Blair 2017).  
Care-givers also typically reinforce, in the mind of the child, the idea that such care-
based transgressions are bad by pointing to the victim’s distress (see, e.g. Nucci and 
Nucci 1982) and it seems plausible that a failure to form a bond of affection with the 
care-giver (or indeed with anyone) undermines these attempts at reinforcement.  
 
Now, it might be objected that the kind of emotionally-informed moral understanding 
that some philosophers have argued is necessary for responsibility is much more 
complex than this basic association of an automatic aversion to others’ distress with 
the “badness” of an act. However, in response, it is not being suggested that this basic 
emotional association is all that moral understanding consists in, but, rather, that it 
may be the (empirically) necessary foundation upon which sophisticated empathy 
and genuine moral understanding are built. Similarly, John Deigh (1995,743) argues 
that the kind of sophisticated empathy necessary for genuine moral understanding 
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emerges gradually “from early experiences of shared feeling... [Empathy takes] 
increasingly mature forms as one's understanding of what it is to be a human being 
and to live a human life deepens”. 
 
If psychopathy is a disorder of moral development, as described, then adult 
psychopaths could not be held responsible on the basis that they should (i.e. were 
under a moral obligation to) have worked out what other people were feeling through 
non-automatic routes, because one needs to be a moral agent in the first place in order 
to recognise what one's moral obligations are. This point is brought out in the 
following passage from Kant. 
“There are certain moral endowments such that anyone lacking them could have no 
duty to acquire them. They are moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbour and 
respect for oneself (self esteem). There is no obligation to have these because they lie 
at the basis of morality. . . All of them are natural predispositions of the mind for 
being affected by concepts of duty. To have these predispositions cannot be 
considered a duty; rather, every...[moral agent] has them, and it is by virtue of them 
that he can be put under an obligation. . . For if [a person] really had no conscience, 
he could not even conceive of the duty to have one. . .” (Gregor tr. 1991, p 400)xiv 
 
If the account of moral development outlined above is correct, then the “moral 
endowments” involved in the normal process of forming a conscience may include 
automatic emotional responses to others’ distress, experienced at a critical stage of 
early development. Evidence that (at least some) adult psychopaths have normal 
neurological responses to others’ distress, which are not engaged automatically, but 
which emerge under specific experimental conditions, does not show that the 
required responses were engaged at the relevant developmental stage. However, this 
25  
 
evidence, might suggest that psychopaths have the ability to acquire moral 
understanding, if they receive interventions that help to elicit the necessary emotional 
responses during moral learning. An analogy might be drawn with learning language. 
Someone might have the neurological architecture necessary to acquire language,  
under certain conditions, but they do not have the ability to speak, unless their ability 
to acquire language has been engaged under those conditions.  
 
Even if reduced amygdala volume in psychopaths is evidence of the “use it or lose 
it”  principle (Jurjako 2019), if psychopaths did not use the necessary brain regions, 
because they were not exposed in early childhood to the conditions in which those 
brain areas would be activated, they cannot fairly be blamed for the underdeveloped 
state of their brains and the impaired emotional capacities that may result.  
 
Section 5: An Individualised Approach to Psychopathy 
 
There is a tendency among theorists to frame some of their arguments in terms of the 
legal and moral responsibility of "psychopaths" as a class or in terms of a subcategory of 
psychopaths (e.g. severe psychopaths, or unsuccessful psychopaths) as a class (see e.g. 
Jalava and Griffiths 2017, Glannon 2017, Glenn et al 2011, Duff 1977). This approach might 
seem odd from a medico-legal perspective, since mental incapacity defences generally 
require an individualized assessment of the accused's capacities at the time of crime. 
Simply showing that the accused belonged to class of people with a particular medical 
diagnosis, by itself, generally cannot settle the question of whether that individual was 
criminally responsible. Now, if the term "psychopath" were being used as a philosophical 
(rather than medical) concept, defined in terms of the complete lack of certain capacities 
that were argued to be pre-requisites for moral agency (see Duff 1977), it would make 
sense to talk of the non-responsibility of psychopaths in general. However, many theorists 
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use the term "psychopath" to refer to a medical diagnosis, such as "PCL-R psychopathy", 
and it is relatively unusual for it to be the case that all individuals with a particular 
medical diagnosis are never responsible. This could be the case for conditions such as 
severe intellectual disabilities, advanced dementia, or advanced Huntingdon's disease, 
but it is not true of many other conditions such as depression, bi-polar disorder, anxiety 
disorders, or schizophrenia, which can undermine the responsibility of some sufferers on 
some occasions. 
 
Such considerations suggest that the criminal and moral responsibility of individual 
PCL-R psychopaths should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (Jalava and Griffiths 
2017, Shaw 2016 & 2009). Indeed, even if one were employing the word "psychopathy" 
as a philosophical concept, defined in terms of the absence of certain pre-requisites for 
responsibility, it would still need to be established on a case-by-case basis that an 
individual wrongdoer met this definition of psychopathy. When arguing for an 
individualised approach, Jurjako and Malatesti (2018) helpfully distinguish between 
general capacities and specific capacities. A general capacity is an ability that an agent 
can exercise in a suitably wide range of contexts, but not necessarily in all circumstances; 
whereas a specific capacity is an ability that an agent can exercise on a particular 
occasion. For example, a person may have the general capacity to play the piano but 
might lack the specific capacity to do so in certain circumstances, e.g. when she is asleep, 
or has no access to a piano. They rightly maintain that, when considering whether a 
psychopath is morally/criminally responsible for committing a wrongful/criminal act, it  
is relevant  to  consider  the  psychopath' s specific capacities to understand and act in 





This chapter drew attention to a question that has been paid insufficient attention in the legal 
philosophical literature on the criminal responsibility of psychopaths –who should bear the 
burden of proving that they are or are not responsible and to what standard? It provided some 
reasons for thinking that raising a reasonable doubt as to psychopaths’ capacity for moral 
understanding should be enough to justify exempting them from criminal responsibility and 
punishment. (Although it may still of course be necessary to hospitalise or treat them – if 
effective treatments can be developed - to prevent them from harming others – for discussion 
of this issue see Shaw 2018). This chapter summarised relevant research on psychopathy and 
discussed an interpretation of this research that was consistent with psychopaths being entitled 
to an excuse on sentimentalist grounds (having also argued that any doubt about 
sentimentalism should be dealt with in favour of the accused.) Finally, this chapter proposed 
that it should be decided on a case-by-case basis whether someone diagnosed with 
psychopathy should be excused from criminal responsibility.  
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i For discussions of varieties of sentimentalism and rival theories see: Kauppinen (2014) and Gill (2007). 
ii Although some theorists who endorse this conclusion base their arguments on psychopaths’ (supposed) 
rational, rather than emotional incapcities. 
iii Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481 
ivMcNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & F 210). Ramadan (2002, p247) provides a useful summary of 
variations between jurisdictions in terms of the nature of the burden placed on the accused.  
v The Law Commission made this proposal in the context of arguing that the current insanity defence in 
England and Wales should be abolished and replaced by a “recognised medical condition” defence.  
vi This capacity to respond to another’s emotion with an appropriate emotion is sometimes called “affective 
empathy”. In contrast, “cognitive empathy” (or “theory of mind”) is the ability to work out what someone is 
feeling (“affective” theory of mind) or knows/believes (“cognitive” theory of mind). (For a useful diagram 
outlining the connections between these concepts see: Sebastian 2011, p814). These deficits may interact. 
Difficulties working out what someone is feeling could interfere with one’s ability to respond with appropriate 
emotions. Similarly, if one feels nothing when witnessing another’s emotion, one may attend less to others’ 
emotions, interfering with the ability to recognise others’ emotions. It is often claimed that psychopathy mainly 
impairs affective empathy (e.g. Blair 2008, Bollard 2013, Nelkin 2016), whereas certain other conditions, such 
as mild autism spectrum disorders, mainly affect cognitive empathy (Montgomery et al 2016 and see references 
listed in Baron-Cohen et al 2019). However, there is some evidence, discussed in section 5.1.3 of this chapter, 
suggesting that some psychopaths may suffer both from reduced affective empathy and (to some extent) 
reduced cognitive empathy (specifically reduced automatic affective theory of mind). It seems that individuals 
with mild autism spectrum disorder can have intact moral understanding and a strong moral code, despite 
problems with cognitive empathy, suggesting that reduced cognitive empathy per se is not an insuperable 
barrier to moral understanding, if affective empathy is intact.  For further discussion of the relevance of 
different types of empathy impairment (seen in autism versus psychopathy) to the capacities required for 
responsibility (see, e.g. Kennett 2002, Bollard 2013, Nelkin 2016, Dineen 2019). 
vii This capacity to feel concern for another is sometimes referred to as “sympathy” (Sebastian 2011). For the 
purposes of this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, “empathy” will refer to “affective empathy” (as defined in 
the previous footnote) together with “sympathy”. 
viii The point that emotional response to wrongdoing tends to diminish with spatial and temporal distance was 
considered by Hume, who maintained that sympathy was the source of moral judgements. He argued that reason 
tells us that that human suffering which occurs in a distant land is no less bad than suffering which is more 
immediate. By analogy, he argued, reason tells us that objects do not really diminish in size the further we move 
away from them. However, this does not show that reason alone could enable us to make moral judgements any 
more than reason alone without visual sensations could allow us to make judgements about the real and 
apparent sizes of the objects which we see (Hume, Seby-Bigge Ed. 1975). For another broadly Humean 
response to this kind of problem see: Radcliff (1994). 
ix McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, per Lord Chief Justice Tindal at 210. 
x Although Hare denies that this necessarily means that they should be exempt from legal responsibility. 
xi Haji (1998) has suggested the opposite – arguing that it is easier to justify holding psychopaths legally rather 
than morally responsible. Furthermore, the requirements for some conceptions of moral responsibility might be 




appraisability” sense see Pereboom 2006). 
xii Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481. 
xiii Earlier in the article, Jurjako and Malatesti make the more modest claim that the current evidence does not 
warrant the conclusions that "psychopaths lack moral understanding" or that they "should be excused from 
criminal responsibility". In other words, at this earlier point in their article, they merely make the negative 
claim that those who argue for the non-responsibility of psychopaths have not (yet) proved their case 
(2018, p1013). 
xiv I Kant (Gregor tr. 1991). This passage is also cited in Fine and Kennett (2004). This passage in Kant may 
appear to contradict Kant’s seemingly cognitivist position discussed in the previous section. For a discussion 
that can shed light on how to interpret these conflicting strands in Kant’s moral theory see: M Midgley, ‘The 
Objection to Systematic Humbug’ (1978) 53 (204) Philosophy 147. 
